Integrative pluralism, as opposed to an integrative monism (as in ‘old school metatheory’), vis-à-vis the problem of theoretical pluralism. Integrative pluralism has two declensions, epistemological (emphasized by integral theory) and ontological (highlighted by critical realism). Its epistemological declension has to do with the problem of theoretical pluralism (for example, in the social sciences), and two distinct meanings of the notion of ‘integration’ that correspond to monistic and pluralistic modes of integration, respectively. The monistic approach of ‘old school’ metatheory attempts to assert a singular, totalizing, abstract, and universal overarching theory that does not adequately accommodate either for competing perspectives or the real depth and diversity of the world. It homogenizes the diversity of theories into a univocal, hegemonic perspective that fails to honour the autonomy and integrity of each theory in its own right. In this context, integrative monism is essentially a modernist approach that attempts to forge a totalizing super-theory that supplants and reductively marginalizes other theories, sometimes under the guise of ‘integration.’ In contrast, integrative pluralism in its epistemological mode “retains an appreciation for the multiplicity of perspectives while also developing new knowledge that connects their definitive elements to build more expansive, ‘roomier’ metatheoretical frameworks” (M. G. Edwards, 2010, p. 16). It takes an approach of weaving together a multiplicity of theoretical perspectives into an emergent, heterogenous identity-in-difference or unity-in-diversity (unitas multiplex) rather than a kind of erasure or fusion of difference and the reduction of the complex multiplicity to simple unity.